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Abstract—We give the first communication-optimal docu-
ment exchange protocol. For any n and k < n our randomized
scheme takes any n-bit file F and computes a Θ(k log n
k
)-bit
summary from which one can reconstruct F , with high proba-
bility, given a related file F ′ with edit distance ED(F, F ′) ≤ k.
The size of our summary is information-theoretically order
optimal for all values of k, giving a randomized solution to
a longstanding open question of [1, Orlitsky; FOCS’91]. It
also is the first non-trivial solution for the interesting setting
where a small constant fraction of symbols have been edited,
producing an optimal summary of size O(H(δ)n) for k =
δn. This concludes a long series of better-and-better protocols
which produce larger summaries for sub-linear values of k and
sub-polynomial failure probabilities. In particular, the recent
break-through of [2, Belazzougui, Zhang; FOCS’16] assumes
that k < nǫ, produces a summary of size O(k log2 k+k log n),
and succeeds with probability 1− (k log n)−O(1).
We also give an efficient derandomized document exchange
protocol with summary size O(k log2 n
k
). This1 improves, for
any k, over a deterministic document exchange protocol by
Belazzougui [6] with summary size O(k2 + k log2 n). Our de-
terministic document exchange directly provides new efficient
systematic error correcting codes for insertions and deletions.
These (binary) codes correct any δ fraction of adversarial
insertions/deletions while having a rate of 1−O(δ log2 1
δ
) and
improve over the codes of Guruswami and Li and Haeupler,
Shahrasbi and Vitercik which have rate 1−Θ
(√
δ logO(1) 1
ǫ
)
.
Keywords-document exchange, insertions and deletions, error
correcting codes, edit distance
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper gives the first efficient solution for the docu-
ment exchange problem with an order optimal summary size.
Our efficient randomized hashing scheme takes any n-bit file
F and for any k computes an optimal sized O(k log n
k
)-bit
summary from which one can reconstruct F given a related
Supported in part by NSF grants CCF-1618280, CCF-1814603, CCF-
1527110, NSF CAREER award CCF-1750808, and a Sloan Research
Fellowship.
1The same derandomization result was simultaneously and independently
discovered by [3, Cheng, Jin, Li and Wu; FOCS’18]. Both works were put
on arxiv days apart [4], [5]. However, the author served on the program
committee of FOCS’18 and was as such not permitted to submit his work
there.
file F ′ with edit distance2 ED(F, F ′) ≤ k. We also give a
near optimal derandomization which deterministically com-
putes an O(k log2 n
k
) bit summary. This leads to improved
systematic binary error correcting codes which efficiently
correct any δ fraction of adversarial insertions and deletions
while achieving a near optimal rate of 1−O(δ log2 1
δ
).
Document exchange, or remote data synchronization, is an
important problem in practice that frequently occurs when
synchronizing files across computer systems or maintaining
replicated data collections over a bandwidth limited network.
In the simplest version it consists of two machines that
each hold a copy of an n-bit file F ′ where on one machine
this file may have been updated to F . When updating the
data on the other machine one would ideally like to only
send information about their differences instead of sending
the whole file F . This is particularly important because
network bandwidth and data transfer times are limiting
factors in most applications and F often differs little from
F ′, e.g., only a small number k of changes have been applied
or a small fraction of the content has been edited, i.e.,
k = δn for some small constant δ ∈ (0, 1). This “scenario
arises in a number of applications, such as synchronization
of user files between different machines, distributed file
systems, remote backups, mirroring of large web and ftp
sites, content distribution networks, or web access [over a
slow network]” [7].
One can imagine a multi-round protocol in which the two
machines adaptively figure out which parts of the outdated
file have not been changed and need not be transmitted.
However, multi-round protocols are too costly and not
possible in many settings. They incur long network round-
trip times and if multiple machines need updating then a
separate synchronization protocol needs to be run for each
individual such machine. Surprisingly, Orlitsky [1], who
initiated the theoretical study of this problem in 1991, proved
that the party knowing F can compute a short summary
of Θ(k log n
k
) bits which can then be used by any other
party i knowing a file F ′i , which differs from F by k
2The edit distance ED(F,F ′) between two strings F and F ′ is the
minimal number of insertions, deletions, or symbol changes that transform
one string into the other.
potentially very different edits to recover F and the k edits
that have been applied to obtain F from F ′i . This is initially
quite surprising especially because the summary is, up to
constants, of equal size as a description of the unknown
changes themselves. Indeed, an exchange of Ω(k log n
k
)
bits is information-theoretically necessary to describe the
difference between two n-bit strings of edit distance k.
Unfortunately however, Orlitsky’s result is merely existential
and requires exponential time computations for recovery,
which prevents the result to be of practical use. Pointing
out several powerful potential applications, Orlitsky left the
question of an efficient single-round document exchange
protocol that matches the non-constructive O(k log n
k
) sum-
mary size as an open question which has since inspired many
theoretical and practical results working towards this goal.
This paper solely focuses on such single-round document
exchange schemes. For simplicity, like all other prior works,
we assume that a good upper bound k on the edit distance
ED(F, F ′) is known3.
In practice rsynch [8] has become a widely used tool
to achieve efficient two-round document exchange / file
synchronization while minimizing the amount of information
sent. Rsynch is also used as a routine in the rdiff tool to
efficiently compute changes between files, e.g., in version
control systems. Many similar protocols have been suggested
and implemented. Unfortunately rsynch and almost all other
tools do not have any guarantees on the size of the data
communicated and it is easy to give examples on which these
algorithms perform extremely poorly. A notable exception is
a scheme of Irmak, Mihaylov and Suel [7].
On the theoretical side the protocol of [7] was the first
computationally efficient single-round document exchange
scheme with a provable guarantee on the size of a summary
in terms of the edit distance k = ED(F, F ′) achieving
a size of O(k log n
k
logn). Independently developed fuzzy
extractors [9] can also be seen as providing a document
exchange scheme for some k polynomially small in n. A
randomized scheme by Jowhari [10] independently achieved
a size of O(k logn log∗ n). In two recent break-throughs
Chakraborty, Goldenberg, and Koucky` [11] designed a
low distortion embedding from edit distance to hamming
distance which can be used to get a summary of size
Θ(k2 logn) and Bellazougi and Zhang [2] further build
on this randomized embedding and achieved a scheme
with summary size Θ(k log2 k + k log n) which is order
optimal for4 k = exp(
√
logn). All of these schemes are
randomized. The first deterministic scheme with summary
size Θ(k2 + k log2 n) was given by Belazzougui [6]. All
these document exchange schemes have some sub-linear
3Alternatively starting with k = 1 and doubling k until the recovery was
successful leads to the same amount of communication, up to a factor of
two, since the summary size only depends linearly on k.
4We write exp(x) as a shortcut for Θ(1)x = 2Θ(x).
restriction on the maximal magnitude of k. For example,
the breakthrough result of [2] assumes that k < nε for some
sufficiently small constant ε > 0. In particular, there does not
exist a scheme which works for the interesting case where
the edit distance k is a small constant fraction δ of the file
length, e.g., if 1% of the content has been edited.
Deterministic document exchange solutions are further-
more related to error correcting codes for insertions and
deletions, another topic that has been studied quite intensely
recently [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19] (see
also these surveys [20], [21]). In particular, as we will
see later, any single-round deterministic document exchange
scheme with summary size s = Θ(|SF |) for edit distance
Θ(k) is equivalent5 to an systematic error correcting block
code with redundancy Θ(s) which can correct up to Θ(k)
errors. Through this equivalence one can derive a systematic
insdel code with redundancy O(k2 + k log2 n) from the
deterministic document exchange of Belazzougui [2]. A
non-systematic code with redundancy O(k2 log k logn) was
given by by Brakensiek, Guruswami and Zbarsky [18] but
this code is only efficient for constant k. Most other works
on error correcting insdel codes [12], [13], [14], [15], [16],
[17] have focused on the setting where a constant fraction of
symbols have been corrupted, i.e., k = δn. For large finite al-
phabets Haeupler and Shahrasbi [15] gave insdel codes with
optimal redundancy (up to a (1 + ε) factor) and for binary
codes Guruswami and Li [14] and Haeupler, Shahrasbi and
Vitercik [16] gave efficient codes for insertions and deletions
with redundancy Θ
(√
δ logO(1) 1
δ
· n
)
for any sufficiently
small constant δ.
II. OUR RESULTS
We positively answer the 28 year old open question
of Orlitsky [1] asking for an efficient document exchange
scheme matching the optimal summary size of the existential
results, at least for the randomized case, and give an efficient
randomized hashing scheme for the single-round document
exchange problem which, for any k, produces a summary of
order optimal size Θ(k log n
k
).
Theorem II.1. For any k > 0 there is a randomized
algorithm, which given any n-bit string F produces a
Θ(k log n
k
)-bit summary SF . There also is a deterministic
recovery algorithm, which given SF and any string F
′ that
is independent from the randomness used for computing SF
and satisfies ED(F, F ′) ≤ k, recovers the string F with
high probability, i.e., with probability 1− n−O(1).
This improves over the recent break-through of [2] which
produces a summary of size Θ(k log2 k+k logn) and works
5This equivalency does not hold for randomized document exchange
schemes or for non-systematic error correcting codes for insertions and
deletions.
as long as k < nε. We remark that the scheme in [2]
has a failure probability which is polylogarithmic in n and
polynomial in k whereas the scheme in Theorem II.1 works
with high probability. If one wants to boost the scheme
in [2] to work with high probability one needs to send
logn
log k+log logn independent summaries making the overall
summary size (up to a log log n for sub-logarithmic k) equal
to Θ(k log k logn+ k log
2 n
log k ) = Ω(k log
1.5 n).
As a precursor to our main result we obtain a doc-
ument exchange protocol with sub-optimal summary size
that has the advantage that it can be efficiently deran-
domized6. This gives a deterministic document exchange
protocol with summary size Θ(k log2 n
k
), improving over
the deterministic scheme by Belazzougui[6] with summary
size Θ(k2 + k logn).
Theorem II.2. There is a deterministic document exchange
algorithm, which given any any k > 0 and any n-bit string
F produces a Θ(k log2 n
k
)-bit summary SF , such that a
deterministic recovery algorithm, which is given SF and any
string F ′ with edit distance ED(F, F ′) ≤ k, recovers F .
The schemes from Theorem II.1 and Theorem II.2 are
the first document exchange protocols which work for the
interesting setting in which a constant fraction of edits
need to be communicated. In particular, if the edit distance
between F and F ′ is δn for some small constant δ > 0 then
our optimal randomized scheme produces a summary of size
Θ(nδ log 1/δ) = Θ(nH(δ))≪ n, where H(.) is the binary
entropy function. Our deterministic scheme incurs another
log 1
δ
factor but the summary size of Θ(nδ log2 1
δ
) is still
much smaller than n for sufficiently small δ.
As mentioned above, efficient deterministic document
exchange protocols are known to be equivalent to effi-
cient, systematic error correcting codes for insertions and
deletions. Via this equivalency the deterministic document
exchange scheme from Theorem II.2 directly gives the
following near optimal, efficient, systematic error correcting
codes for insertions and deletions which work for any
k adversarial insertions and deletions with near optimal
redundancy Θ(k
log2 n
k
log q + k).
Theorem II.3. For any n, any k < n, and any finite
alphabet Σ of size q = |Σ| ≥ 2 there is a simple
deterministic encoding algorithm which takes an input string
X ∈ Σn and outputs a systematic codeword C(X) ∈ Σn+r
consisting of X itself and r = Θ(k
log2 n
k
log q + k) redundant
extra symbols and a deterministic decoding algorithm Adec
such that for any X and any C′ with ED(C′, C(X)) ≤ k
6The same derandomization result was simultaneously and independently
discovered by [3, Cheng, Jin, Li and Wu; FOCS’18]. Both works were put
on arxiv days apart [4], [5]. However, the author served on the program
committee of FOCS’18 and was as such not permitted to submit his work
there.
we have Adec(C
′) = X , i.e., one can recover X from any
corrupted codeword C′ which is k-close to C(X) in edit
distance.
This is an almost quadratic improvement in terms of
redundancy and rate loss compared to the state-of-the-
art binary insdel codes of Brakensiek, Guruswami and
Zbarsky [18] and Belazzougui [2] for small values of k
and the codes of Guruswami et al. [13], [14] and Haeupler,
Shahrasbi and Vitercik [16], [15] for the case of a constant
fraction of corruptions. A more detailed comparison is given
in Section V.
III. HASH FUNCTIONS AND SUMMARY STRUCTURE
In this section we describe and define the simple inner-
product hash functions used in our schemes and the content
and structure of the summary SF of F . We start by giving
some intuition about the summary structure in Section III-A,
give our string notation in Section III-B, formally define
our hash function in Section III-C, and define our summary
structure in Section III-D.
A. Intuition for the Summary Structure
Essentially all document exchange algorithms used in
practice, including rsynch, use the very natural idea of
cutting the file F into blocks and sending across hashes
of these blocks in order to identify which of these blocks
are contained in F ′ without any edits.
Once identical blocks have been identified the remaining
information containing all differences between F and F ′
is small and can be transmitted. The protocol of Irmak,
Mihaylov and Suel [7] also follows this strategy. However,
it does not use a fixed block length but uses log n
k
levels7
of exponentially decreasing block length. This allows to
progressively zoom into larger blocks containing some edits
to identify smaller blocks within them that do not contain
an edit. Given that higher levels should already identify
large parts of the string F that are identical to F ′ and
thus known to the party reconstructing F many of the
hashes of lower levels will not be of interest to the party
reconstructing F ′. To avoid having to send these hashes
one could run an adaptive multi-level protocol in which
the reconstructing party provides feedback at each level. A
great and much simpler single-round alternative introduced
by [7] is to use (the non-systematic part of) systematic
error correcting codes which allows the receiving party to
efficiently reconstruct the hashes it is missing, without the
sending party needing to know which hashes these are.
The summary SF now simply consists of these encodings
of hashes of all log n
k
levels and this summary can be
sent to the reconstructing party in a single-round document
7All logarithms in this paper are with respect to basis two unless stated
otherwise.
exchange protocol. Given that at most ED(F, F ′) blocks can
be corrupted in each level the summary size is Θ(k log n
k
·o)
where o is the size of a single hash. Using randomized
o = Θ(logn)-bit hashes with Θ(logn)-bit seeds, which are
guaranteed to be correct with high probability, leads to the
Θ(k log n
k
· logn) bit summary size of [7].
The hashing schemes in this paper mostly follow the same
practical framework. In fact, the summary structure we use
for our simpler (sub-optimal deterministic) document ex-
change protocol with summary size Θ(k log2 n
k
) is identical
to [7] except that we use a smaller hash size o = Θ(log n
k
)
and a compact way to describe the randomness used for
hashing, which can then also be used for derandomization.
Our main result further reduces the hash size o to merely
a fixed constant. This requires an much more robust re-
covery algorithm which can deal with high hash collision
probabilities. In particular, since the failure probability of a
hash is exponential in the hash size o, choosing o = logn
as in [7] implies that no hash collision happens with high
probability and choosing o = log n
k
still keep the expected
number of hash collisions at O(k), that is, at the same order
of magnitude as the errors one has to deal with anyway. The
fact that recovery from constant size hashes with a constant
failure probability is even existentially possible requires a
much more intricate probabilistic analysis. Furthermore, the
key trick used in [7], [6], [5] to use error correcting codes to
obliviously communicate the missing or incorrect hashes in
each round inherently requires Θ(k log n
k
)-bits to be sent in
each of the log n
k
levels. This forms another serious barrier
that needs to be overcome for our main result.
B. String Notation
Next we briefly give the string notation we use throughout.
Let S ∈ Σ∗ be a string. We denote with |S| the length
of S and for any i, j ∈ [1, |S|] with i ≤ j we denote
with S[i, j] the substring of S between the ith and jth
symbol, both included. A sub-string of S is always a set
of consecutive symbols in S, i.e., any string of the form
S[i, j]. We also use multi-dimensional arrays of symbols, in
which every index typically begins with 0. An array position
H [i, j] with i, j ∈ N0 can either contain a symbol over some
alphabet Σ′ or be empty. We denote with H [i, .] the string
of symbols (H [i, 1], H [i, 2], . . .) containing all symbols of
the form H [i, j].
C. Inner-Product Hash Function hasho
R
and Randomness
Table R
Next we describe our hash function hash, which com-
putes nothing more than some F2-inner-products between
its input string and some random bits.
To properly keep track of the randomness used we will
think of the randomness being supplied by a three dimen-
sional table of bits we call R. We remark that our algorithms
do not actually need to instantiate or compute R explicitly.
Instead the description of the bits contained in R will be
so simple that they can be generated/computed on the spot
whenever needed.
In addition to the string S ∈ Σ∗ to be hashed we supply
four more arguments to hash. A call like hasho
R
(S, s, ℓ)
produces a hash of the string S ∈ Σ∗ using the randomness
table R. The parameter o ∈ N denotes the size of the hash,
i.e., the number of bits that are produced as an output. The
parameters s and ℓ denote to which starting position and
level the hash belongs to, respectively. These parameters are
used to describe where in the randomness table R to pull the
randomness for the inner product from. This ensures firstly
that hashes for different levels and intervals use different
or “fresh” random bits and secondly that summary creation
and recovery consistently use the same parts of R when
testing whether two strings stem from the same interval
in the original string F . The inner product computed by
hash
o
R
(S, s, ℓ) is now simply the o-bit string h1, . . . , ho for
which hi =
⊕|S|
j=1 (S[j] ·R[s+ j − 1, ℓ, i]).
Note that if R is filled with independent and uniformly
distributed bits we have that any two non-identical strings
have colliding hashes with probability 2−o, i.e., for every
k ∈ N , S 6= S′ ∈ Σk and o, s, ℓ ∈ N it holds that
PR[hash
o
R
(S, s, ℓ) = hasho
R
(S′, s, ℓ)] = 2−o.
The reason for this is that each of the o output bits in-
dependently is an inner product between the string to be
hashed and the same uniformly random bit string of length
|S| taken from R. Therefore the difference between hi and
h′i is the inner product of a uniformly random string and
a non-zero string and as such a uniformly distributed bit.
The probability that each of the o output bits is zero is now
exactly 2−o.
Lastly, we add one further simplification to our hash
function which is that if the output length o is larger than the
length |S| of the string S to be hashed then hasho
R
(S, s, ℓ)
simply outputs S as a “hash”, possibly padded with zeros.
This gives a collision probability of zero for any two same-
length strings with length at most o and allows to read off
the string S from its hash.
D. Summary Structure and Construction
In this section we formally describe and define the sum-
mary structure and construction which follows the informal
description given in Section III-A:
The summary algorithm takes the string F it wants to
summarize, the parameter k which essentially governs how
many hashes are provided per level (in coded form) and the
parameter o which determines the hash size of the hashes
used. For simplicity of the description we assume that the
length n = |F | of the string F equals 4k · 2L for some
integer L, i.e., n is a multiple of 4k and n4k is a power
of two. This assumption is without loss of generality: One
can send the length of F along with the summary and, for
the hash computations, extend F to a string of length 4k ·
2m, with L = ⌈log2 n4k⌉, by adding zeros to the end. The
recovery algorithm simply adds the same number of zeros
to F ′ during the recovery and removes them again in the
end.
The summary SF contains the following coded hashes
organized into L+ 1 levels:
• The level zero simply cuts F into 4k equal size pieces
and records the hashes for each piece. I.e., let ∀i ∈
[0, 4k − 1] : H [0, i] = hasho
R
(F [1 + i · 2L, (i + 1) ·
2L], i · 2L, 0) and we include H [0, .], which consists of
ko bits, in the summary.
• For level ℓ ∈ [1, L] we cut F into 4k · 2ℓ equal
size pieces, compute the hash for each piece to form
H [ℓ, .]. The hashes themselves however are too large
to be sent completely. Instead our warm-up (deter-
ministic) scheme encodes these hashes using an error
correcting code Cj which is simply the non-systematic
part of a systematic linear [4k2ℓ + 100k, 4k2ℓ, 11k]
error correcting code over F2o . Such a code exists
and many explicit constructions based on algebraic
geometry are known if o = Θ(logn/k). Our optimal
document exchange protocol with o = Θ(1) requires
a more sophisticated scheme which we describe in
Section IV-D. The information included in SF for this
scheme consists of one or multiple hashes of (subsets
of) H [ℓ, .] of total size Θ(o′k) for some sufficiently
large constant o′ > o.
We remark that the hashes H [ℓ, .] of levels ℓ ≥ L −
⌊log2 o⌋ are hashes of strings of length at most o. In this
case the hash function hasho
R
simply outputs the strings itself
making H [L, .] (or already H [L − ⌊log2 o⌋, .]) essentially
equal to F itself.
In addition to these coded hashes the summary SF also
contains the length |F | and a compact description of the
randomness table R. Throughout this paper we will use
the ε-biased probability spaces of Naor and Naor [22] for
this compact description. In particular, we prove for all our
schemes that the bits in R do not need to be independent
uniform bits but that it suffices if they are sampled from a
distribution with reasonably small bias. The often exploited
fact that a sample point from an ε-biased distribution over
nO(1) bits can be described by only O(log 1
ε
+ logn)
bits allows us to give very compact descriptions of the
randomness used and send these along in the summary SF .
In particular, we do not need to assume that the summary
construction and the summary recovery algorithm have any
shared source of randomness.
IV. RECOVERY ALGORITHMS
This section describes our recovery algorithms. We start in
Section IV-A by defining hash induced substring matchings,
which form the basis for our algorithms and their analysis.
We then describe our recovery algorithms. In Section IV-B
we first describe a randomized algorithm which produces a
summary of size Θ(k log2 n
k
). This is a good warm-up for
our main result. It demonstrates the overall algorithmic struc-
ture common to both our recovery algorithms, introduces the
basic probabilistic analysis used to analyze them, and makes
it easier to understand the problems that need to be addressed
when pushing both the algorithmic ideas and the analysis to
the limit for our main result. We also show in Section V
how to derandomize this scheme to obtain Theorem II.2.
Lastly, Section IV-D contains the order optimal randomized
hashing scheme which uses constant size hashes and thus
achieves the optimal summary size of Θ(k log n
k
).
A. Hash Induced Substring Matchings
For every n, k, ℓ we say that two index sequences
i1, . . . , ik′ , i
′
1, . . . , i
′
k′ ∈ [1, n − 2L−ℓ + 1] of length k′ are
a level-ℓ size-k′ (sub-string) matching between two strings
F, F ′ ∈ {0, 1}n induced by hasho
R
if
• i1 ≤ i2 ≤ . . . ≤ ik′ ,
• all i-indices are starting points of blocks that got hashed
in SF in level ℓ, i.e, ij − 1 is a multiple of 2L−ℓ for
every j ∈ [1, k′], and
• hashes of the strings in blocks that are matched
are identical (we also say the hashes are match-
ing or consistent), i.e., for all j ∈ [1, k′] we have
that hasho
R
(F [ij , ij + 2
L−ℓ − 1], ij − 1, ℓ) equals
hash
o
R
(F ′[i′j, i
′
j + 2
L−ℓ − 1], ij − 1, ℓ). In the rare
instances where we (temporarily) relax this requirement
we speak of a non-proper matching.
Furthermore, we call such a matching
• monotone if i′1 ≤ i′2 ≤ . . . ≤ i′k′ ,
• disjoint if intervals that are matched in F ′ are not
overlapping, i.e., we have for every j, j′ ∈ [1, k′] with
j 6= j′ that |i′j − i′j′ | ≥ 2L−ℓ.
• bad or k′-bad if for every matched blocks in F and
F ′ the actual strings are non-identical (despite having
identical hashes), i.e., if for all j ∈ [1, k′] we have that
F [ij, ij + 2
L−ℓ − 1] 6= F ′[i′j , i′j + 2L−ℓ − 1].
• k-plausible if it is monotone and |i1 − i′1| + |(|F | −
ik′)−(|F ′|−i′k′)|+
∑k′−1
j=1 |(ij−i′j)−(ij+1−i′j+1)| ≤
k. Note that a monotone matching is k-plausible if it
can be explained by at most k insertion and deletion
operations.
We generally assume all our matchings to be proper, mono-
tone, and disjoint and often omit these qualifiers. Whenever
we talk about non-necessarily monotone, not-necessarily
proper or not-necessarily non-disjoint matchings we ex-
plicitly label these matchings as non-disjoint, non-proper
and/or non-monotone. Furthermore, if the context allows it
we sometimes omit mentioning the strings F, F ′, the hash
function hasho
R
, or the level ℓ with respect to which a
matching satisfies the above conditions.
For any two strings F, F ′ one can compute a monotone
matching of maximum size in time linear in the length of
the strings n and polynomial in k using a standard dynamic
program. The same is true for a maximum size disjoint,
bad, or k-plausible monotone matching. It is furthermore
likely that using the same techniques which transforms the
standard O(nk) dynamic program for edit distance into an
O(n+k2) dynamic program [23] can also be used to obtain
O(n+kO(1)) algorithms for the above maximum monotone
matching variants as well.
B. Algorithm 1: Simple Level-wise Recovery
Algorithm 1 Simple Recovery with o = Θ(log n
k
) and
Summary Size O(k log2 n
k
)
1: get HF [0, .] from SF
2: for ℓ = 0 to L− 1 do
3: Ml ← largest level-ℓ disjoint monotone matching
from hashes in HF [ℓ, .] into F
′
⊲ Recover level ℓ+ 1 hashes
4: H˜F [ℓ+ 1, .]← guesses for level ℓ+ 1 hashes using
Mℓ and F
′
5: HF [ℓ + 1, .] ← DecodeCℓ+1(H˜F [ℓ +
1, .], encoding of HF [ℓ + 1, .] from SF )
6: F ← HF [L, .]
Our first recovery algorithm, which we call Simple Level-
wise Recovery, is now easily given (see also the pseudo-code
description of this algorithm, which is given as Algorithm 1):
Assume that the recovery algorithm has recovered all 4k ·
2ℓ hashes HF [ℓ, .] of F at level ℓ correctly. Initially ℓ = 0
and this assumption is trivially true because these hashes
are included in the summary SF . Equipped with these 4k ·
2ℓ hashes the algorithm finds the largest monotone disjoint
matching between the level ℓ blocks in F and blocks in F ′
of the same length. The recovery algorithm now guesses the
level ℓ + 1 hashes HF [ℓ + 1, .] of F using Mℓ and F
′ as
follows: Each block of F in level ℓ splits into exactly two
blocks in level ℓ + 1. For any block in F that is matched
to a sub-string in F ′ with an identical hash the recovery
algorithm guesses that the strings in these blocks are also
identical and computes the hashes for the two sub-blocks
in level ℓ + 1 by applying hasho
R
to the appropriate sub-
string in F ′. If a block in F is not matched one can fill in
something arbitrarily as a guess or mark it as an erasure.
The hope is that the vector of hashes H˜F [ℓ + 1, .] for level
ℓ+1 guessed in this way is close in Hamming distance to the
correct hashes HF [ℓ+1, .]. If this is the case, concatenating
H˜F (ℓ+1, .) with the redundancy Encℓ+1 for level ℓ+1 from
SF and decoding this to the closest codeword in Cℓ correctly
recovers the level ℓ+ 1 hashes HF [ℓ + 1, .] and allows the
algorithm go proceed to the next iteration and level. In this
way the recovery algorithm iteratively recovers the hashes
for every level one by one until level L. In level L blocks are
of constant size and hasho
R
becomes the (padded) identity
function such that one can read off F from HF [L, .].
C. Correctness of Algorithm 1 and k-Bad Matchings
In this subsection we give a sufficient condition for the
correctness of Algorithm 1. In particular, we prove that if
there is no k-bad self-matching in F , i.e., a size-k bad mono-
tone disjoint matching, between F and itself under hasho
R
,
then Algorithm 1 recovers F correctly. In Appendix V we
then show that hashes of size o = Ω(log n
k
) and only little
randomness in R are sufficient to make the existence of such
a witness unlikely, in fact, so little randomness that one can
easily derandomize the algorithm.
To prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 we will argue that
the matching computed in each level is sufficiently large and,
in the absence of a k-bad self-matching, of sufficient quality
to allow the recovery of the hashes for the next level using
the redundancy in SF . This allows the recovery algorithm
then to proceed similarly with the next level.
It is easy to see that the matching computed is always
large assuming that F and F ′ are not too different:
Lemma IV.1. Assuming that the hashes for level ℓ were
correctly recovered, Algorithm 1 computes a matching of
size at least 4k · 2l − ED(F, F ′) in level ℓ.
Proof: Since F and F ′ differ by only ED(F, F ′)
insertion, deletions, or symbol corruptions and since each
such edit can affect at most one block we know that we can
look at the monotone matching which matches all blocks in
F which did not suffer from such an edit to its identical
sub-string in F ′. Since the hashes were correctly recovered
and the hashes use the same parts of R to compute the inner-
producet hashes this is a valid monotone matching of size
4k ·2l−ED(F, F ′). Since Algorithm 1 computes the largest
valid matching it finds a matching of at least this size.
We would like to say that if in the summary SF ran-
dom enough hash functions with a small enough collision
probability are used, which usually result from a sufficiently
unbiased R and a large enough hash output length o, then
most of the matching pairs computed by Algorithm 1 are
correct, i.e., correspond to sub-strings of F and F ′ that are
identical under hasho
R
with the randomness R used. For any
matching which contains too many pairs of substrings which
are not-identical but have the same hashes we abstract out
a witness which explains why hasho
R
failed. For this we
focus on bad matching pairs that go between non-identical
intervals in F and F ′ which do not contain any edits. This
however is exactly a k-bad selfmatching in F . The advantage
of looking at such a witness is that its existence only depends
on SF (or hash
o
R
, R and F ) but not on F ′.
Lemma IV.2. Assume that the hashes for level i were
correctly recovered and that for level ℓ there is no k-bad
matching of F to itself under hasho
R
. Then the monotone
matching computed by Algorithm 1 for this level matches at
most ED(F, F ′) + k non-identical blocks in F and F ′.
Proof: F and F ′ differ by only ED(F, F ′) insertion,
deletions, or symbol corruptions and each such edit can
affect at most one of the blocks in F ′ that are matched
to a non-identical block in F . Therefore there are at most
ED(F, F ′) such matches in the monotone matching com-
puted by Algorithm 1. Furthermore, if we restrict ourselves
to the matches between non-identical sub-strings in F and
F ′ computed by Algorithm 1 which are not of this type it
is true that each of these matches comes from matching a
sub-string in F to a sub-string in F ′ which, due to having
no edits in it, is identical do a sub-string in F . Since, by
assumption, Algorithm 1 used the correctly recovered level
ℓ hashes and computes a monotone disjoint matching these
matches form a bad matching in F . By assumption this
matching can be of size at most k giving the desired bound
of at most ED(F, F ′) + k non-identical blocks matched in
F and F ′ by Algorithm 1
Lastly, because we use error correcting codes with suffi-
ciently large distance we can easily correct for the k missing
hashes and 2k incorrect hashes.
Lemma IV.3. Assume that for all levels there is no k-bad
matching of F to itself under hasho
R
used to compute SF ,
which is given to Algorithm 1 as an input. Furthermore
assume that the input file F ′ satisfies ED(F, F ′) ≤ k. Then,
Algorithm 1 correctly outputs F .
Proof: We will first show by induction on the level
ℓ that Algorithm 1 correctly recovers the level ℓ hashes
HF [ℓ, .] of F that were computed for SF . For level ℓ = 0 this
is trivial because these hashes are a part of SF and therefore
given to Algorithm 1 as an input. For the induction step we
want to show that the hashes for level ℓ+1 will be correctly
recovered assuming that this has successfully happened for
the hashes for level ℓ. Here Lemma IV.1 guarantees that a
matching of size 4k · 2l − ED(F, F ′) is computed which
results in at most k = ED(F, F ′) blocks in the level ℓ
of F having no match and therefore at most 2k hashes
in level ℓ + 1 are assigned the erasure symbol “?” in the
guessing step of Algorithm 1. Furthermore, the assumptions
for Lemma IV.2 are satisfied guaranteeing that at most
ED(F, F ′) + k = 2k of the matchings computed by Algo-
rithm 1 in level ℓ belong to non-identical strings in F and
F ′. This results in at most 4k of the hash values computed
in the guessing step of Algorithm 1 being incorrect. The
Hamming distance between the correct hashes HF [i + 1, .]
and the estimate H˜F [i + 1, .] produced by Algorithm 1 is
therefore at most 6k. Given that the error correcting code
used has distance 13k these errors will be corrected leading
to a correct recovery of the level ℓ+ 1 hashes in Step 5 of
Algorithm 1. In its last iteration Algorithm 1 will correctly
recover the level L hashes HF [L, .], which, as discussed at
the end of Section III-D, is equal to F (up to padding extra
zeros to each hash).
It remains to show that k-bad matchings are highly
unlikely. Lemma IV.4 does exactly this. It shows that for
sufficiently random R and o = Ω(log n
k
) with high proba-
bility no k-bad matching exists. We start by showing that
a distribution whose bias is exponentially small in k log n
k
suffices to avoid a k-bad matching with high probability.
This is sufficient to guarantee the correctness of Algorithm
1. We furthermore shows how to extend these arguments
to much lower quality distributions with a polynomially
large bias. Since this second part is important for our
derandomization but not needed to understand our main
result we defer this second part to Section V.
Lemma IV.4. For every sufficiently large c ≥ 1 it holds that
if o = c log n
k
and R is sampled from an (2−2ok)-biased
distribution of bits then for every level ℓ the probability that
there exists a k-bad self-matching of F under hasho
R
is at
most 2−Ω(ok).
Proof: Suppose for sake of simplicity that R is sampled
from iid uniformly random bits. In this case the probability
for any individual sub-strings of F to have a bad hash is
2−o. Furthermore, for a fixed k-bad matching the probability
that all matching pairs are bad under hash is 2−ok. There
furthermore exist at most
(
n
k
)2
= 2O(k log
n
k
) ways to choose
the indices for a potential k-bad matching and therefore
also at most 2O(k log
n
k
) many such matchings. Taking a
union bound over all these potentially bad matchings and
choosing the constant c large enough this guarantees that
the probability that there exists a k-bad matching is at most
2−ok · 2O(k log nk ) = 2−Ω(ok).
Next we argue that the same argument holds if R is 2−cok-
biased. In particular, for every k- matching determining
whether it is a k-bad matching only depends on the outcome
of ok linear tests on bits from R. For each of the 2ok
different outcomes for these tests the probability deviates
at most by 2−2ok from the setting where R is sampled
from iid uniformly random bits and is therefore still at
most 2−ok + 2−2ok = 2−Ω(ok). The same union bound thus
applies.
D. Algorithm 2: Using Constant Size Hashes
In this section we give a more sophisticated and even more
robust recovery algorithm. Surprisingly this algorithm works
even if the hash size o used in the summary computations
is a merely a small constant, leading to our main result,
the order optimal randomized document exchange hashing
scheme.
The main difference between Algorithm 1 and Algo-
rithm 2 is that we take matchings of previous levels into
account and restricting ourself to k-plausible monotone
matchings. This is sufficient to reduce the problem to a
Hamming type problem on how to communicate the next
level of hashes when most of them are already known to
the receiver. However, here we cannot use systematic error
correcting codes anymore but need to develop more efficient
techniques.
Algorithm 2 Randomized Recovery with o = O(1) and
Summary Size O(k log n
k
)
1: M0 ← ∅
2: get HF [0, .] from SF
3: for ℓ = 0 to L− 1 do
⊲ Transform into a proper level ℓ matching
4: remove all matches not consistent with HF [ℓ, .] from
Mℓ
⊲ Compute plausible disjoint monotone matching
for unmatched hashes
5: ∆l ← largest k-plausible level-ℓ matching of hashes
unmatched in Mℓ into F
′
6: Mℓ+1 ← Ml + ∆ℓ (and split all edges into two
making it a (ℓ + 1)-level matching)
⊲ Recover level ℓ+ 1 hashes
7: RecoverHF [ℓ+1, .] by using the substrings matched
in Mℓ+1, guessing Θ(k) incorrect hashes and their
values, and verifying correct guesses with hashes in SF
8: F˜ ← HF [L, .]
We note that the matchings Mℓ produced by Algorithm 2
are not necessarily monotone and not necessarily disjoint,
i.e., they can contain matches to overlapping intervals in F ′.
At the beginning or end of an iteration the matching might
even be a non-proper level ℓ matching in that there can be
matches which stem from matching level (ℓ− 1) hashes but
do not have matching level ℓ hashes. At the beginning of
an iteration such matches are removed making the matching
proper. In order to analyze the progress of Algorithm 2 we
introduce the following notion of an okay matching:
Definition IV.1. We say a level-ℓ non-disjoint non-monotone
non-proper matching Mℓ at the beginning of an iteration of
Algorithm 2 is okay if there are at most 5k unmatched hashes
or bad matches, i.e., matches between intervals in F and F ′
that are not-identical.
We can now prove that each iteration of Algorithm 2
works correctly with exponentially high probability in k,
as long as it starts with an okay matching and as long
as randomness in R is independent between levels and
sufficiently unbiased:
Lemma IV.5. Suppose the randomness in R is at most
exp(−ok)-biased and independent between levels, where
o > 1 is a sufficiently large constant. If, at the beginning
of iteration ℓ of Algorithm 2, the matching Mℓ is okay
and HF [ℓ, .] has been correctly recovered then, with prob
1− exp(−ok), the matching Mℓ+1 is also okay.
Proof: We want to bound the number of unmatched and
bad matches in the matching Mℓ+1 produced by iteration ℓ
of Algorithm 2. By assumption Mℓ is okay and thus has at
most 5k unmatched or bad matches.
The number of unmatched hashes in Mℓ+1 is easily
bounded. In particular, for any unmatched hashes there exists
a k-plausible disjoint monotone matching which leaves at
most k hashes unmatched, namely the one which matches
all blocks in F that do not have an edit in it. This is in
particular true for the hashes that are unmatched after the
matching Mℓ has been cleaned up and transformed into a
proper level-ℓ matching in Step 4 of Algorithm 2. Since
∆ℓ is the largest such matching it leaves at most k hashes
unmatched, which split into at most 2k unmatched hashes
in Mℓ+1 in Step 6 of Algorithm 2.
Next we bound the number of bad matches in Mℓ+1.
There are two potential sources for bad matches, namely,
they can either stem from bad matches in Mℓ that are not
identified as bad matches by HF [ℓ, .], or they can be newly
introduced by the matching ∆ℓ.
The expected number of bad matches of the first type is at
most 5k ·2−o ·2 since each of the at most 5k bad matches in
the okay matching Mℓ has a non-matching hash in HF [ℓ, .]
with probability 2−o and gets split into two potentially bad
matches in Mℓ+1 if it goes undetected. The probability that
this happens to more than k/2 matches leading to more than
k bad edges of this type in Mℓ+1 is at most exp(−ok) even
if the probabilities in R are exp(−ok)-biased.
Next we want to argue that, with probability 1 −
exp(−ok), the matching ∆ℓ introduces at most k new bad
matches which get doubled into at most 2k bad edges in
Mℓ+1. For this we first bound the number of possible ∆ℓ
matchings, given a fixed okayMℓ matching, by exp(k), and
then take a union bound. To count the number of possible
∆ℓ matchings, given a fixed okay Mℓ, we specify such a
matching by indicating which of the at most 5k unmatched
hashes in Mℓ are matched and what the offsets of their
starting positions is. Since |i1 − i′1|+ |(|F | − ik′)− (|F ′| −
i′k′)| +
∑k′−1
j=1 |(ij − i′j) − (ij+1 − i′j+1)|, i.e., the sum of
the differences between these offsets, is at most k for every
k-plausible matching the values and signs of these offsets
can take on at most exp(k) different values. Overall there
are therefore at most exp(k) different possibilities for ∆ℓ
given Mℓ. Furthermore, the probability for any fixed such
matching to be contain k bad matches is at most exp(−ok),
if the randomness in R is independent from Mℓ and at
most exp(−ok)-biased. A union bound over all exp(k)
possibilities for ∆ℓ thus shows that with high probability
at most exp(k − ok) = exp(−ok) there is no ∆ℓ matching
which introduces more than k new bad matches.
Overall, with probability 1 − exp(−ok), this leads to at
most 5k unmatched hashes or bad matches in Mℓ+1 at
the end of iteration ℓ of Algorithm 2, making it an okay
matching as desired.
Lemma IV.5 shows that our improved matching procedure
in Algorithm 2 is robust enough to tolerate hashes of
constant size o = Θ(1). In fact, it guarantees that given an
okay matching for level ℓ and the correctly recovered hashes
for level ℓ a finer grained matching for level ℓ−1 is computed
which is okay, i.e., which allows all but 5k hashes of level
ℓ+1 to be guessed correctly. Algorithm 2 thus achieved the
crucial feat of reducing the edit distance document exchange
problem to its much simpler Hamming type equivalent in
which two parties hold a long string differing by at most 5k
Hamming errors and one party wants to help the other learn
its string.
Remark – Impossibility of Reconciling 5k (Worst-Case)
Hamming Errors with o(k log n
k
) bits: In Algorithm 1 the
reduction to the Hamming problem was all that was needed.
There, too, the recovery algorithm found a guess H˜ [ℓ+1, .]
for H [ℓ + 1, .] which differed by at most O(k) hashes.
Both of these strings of hashes were over an alphabet
of o = log n
k
bits and one could then simply use the
error correcting code idea of [7] to recover H [ℓ + 1, .]
from H˜ [ℓ + 1, .] using Θ(ko) = Θ(k log n
k
) bits of addi-
tional information which could be put into SF . Concretely,
we used the non-systematic part of a systematic linear
[4k2ℓ + 100k, 4k2ℓ, 11k] error correcting code over F2o to
send the equivalent of O(k) hashes and recover the position
and correct value for the 5k hashes differing between the
matching generated guess and the true hashes.
Unfortunately however, for o = Θ(1), such error correct-
ing codes cannot exist and in fact it is easy to verify8 that
it is impossible to reconciliate two parties holding n long
strings over some alphabet Σ differing in any k positions
without sending at least Θ(k · (log n
k
+ log(|Σ| − 1))) bits,
because the position of the differences can already encode
8Thanks to Xin Li and his group for pointing out this error in the
preliminary draft of this work.
log
(
n
k
)
= Θ(k log n
k
) bits. For the encoding used in SF
this implies that either Θ(k log n
k
) bits need to be put into
SF per level to allow the recovery of the Θ(k) bad or
missing hashes, as we do in Algorithm 1, or one needs
to have a better understanding of the distribution of the
typical positions of bad hashes, together with a better coding
scheme which exploits the lower entropy in this distribution
to communicate efficiently. In particular, we would like to
only use Θ(1) bits per bad hash to describe its position and
correct value. This is what we do next.
Understanding the Distribution of Positions of Incor-
rectly Matched Substrings and Defining the Forest of Still
Consistent Matches: Suppose we run Algorithm 2 for ℓ
iterations. As proved in Lemma IV.5, with high probability,
in each level the matching ∆ℓ adds at most 5k newly
matched substrings. These substrings get split in two in
every level thereafter or eliminated if non-matching hashes
reveal that a match is inconsistent (proving that its guess
was wrong). Each matched substring in level ℓ can thus be
classified by the level ℓ′ ≤ ℓ its first ancestor was generated,
which of the at most 5k newly matched substrings in level ℓ′
this ancestor was, and which of the at most 2ℓ−ℓ
′
substrings
stemming from this ancestor it is. In this way the set of all
substrings matched throughout Algorithm 2 can be naturally
organized into ≤ 5k binary trees of depth ℓ − ℓ′ for each
level ℓ′ ≤ ℓ. We call this the forest of all matches.
Throughout Algorithm 2 some of these matches are
discovered to be inconsistent and removed from Mℓ. In
particular, once Algorithm 2 recovers the correct hashes
H [ℓ, .] at the end of iteration ℓ− 1 it will, at the beginning
of the next iteration, check for every matching edge in Mℓ
whether it is consistent and otherwise remove it from Mℓ to
make the matching proper. It is important to note that if a
match is discovered to be bad then all ancestor matches in
the forest of all matches are proven to be bad as well, despite
their consistent hashes having failed to detect this badness
at the time because of a hash collision. We say that a match
is still consistent if it has not (yet) been proven to be bad
through an inconsistent hash of a descendant. The set of all
substrings matched throughout Algorithm 2 which are still
consistent is similarly nicely organized as a forest of binary
trees, where there leafs are exactly the matches/substrings
in Mℓ. The main difference to the forest of all matches is
that when a match in Mℓ is discovered to be inconsistent
then it and all its ancestor matches in its leaf-to-root path are
removed. This cuts a tree of depth d into up to d−1 trees, at
most one for each depth smaller than d. The number of trees
in level ℓ′ therefore never exceeds the number of matches
made in iteration ℓ′ plus the number of bad matches (from
previous iterations) in iteration ℓ′. According to Lemma IV.5
this is at most 5k, with high probability. Throughout the
rest of this paper we focus on the forest of still consistent
matches. We say that a match in Mℓ stems from level ℓ
′ ≤ ℓ
if its root in the forest of still consistent matches is a level
ℓ′ match.
Since hashes fail independently with probability exp(−o)
having a substring stemming from level ℓ′ be discovered to
be wrong has probability exp(−(ℓ − ℓ′)o). Of course there
are also more of these substrings, namely up to 5k2ℓ−ℓ
′
many of them. However, given that o is a sufficiently large
constant a union bound shows that one still expects most bad
matches to be among the substrings stemming from higher
levels with the expected number of bad hashes decaying
exponentially with the level they are stemming from. This
is quite intuitive, given that matches from these more recent
iterations have not been included/tested by hashes quite as
often.
We will rely on this exponential concentration of bad
hashes towards the much smaller number of positions corre-
sponding to recent matches when trying to recover the cor-
rect H [ℓ+1, .] from the guesses for these level ℓ+1 hashes
generated by Mℓ+1. In particular, we identify a sufficiently
small number of plausible guesses for sets of matches or
positions in H [ℓ+1, .] which, with high probability, include
at least one guess which covers all inconsistent hashes. In
fact, we will show that with high probability there is a
guess which is a super-set of all bad hashes. For any such
guessed set of positions for bad/inconsistent hashes we then
enumerate all possible values for these positions to get a
guess for the correct H [ℓ + 1, .]. We then use some extra
hash (or hashes) of H [ℓ + 1, .], which are included in SF ,
to verify if which of the enumerated choices for H [ℓ+1, .]
is correct.
Enumerating Plausible Guesses Using t-Witnesses: To
formally implement this intuition and strategy and to prove
that it works we use combinatorial structures we call t-
witnesses. They are a specially formated way of specifying
some Θ(t) guesses for incorrect positions in H [ℓ, .] (or
equivalently inconsistent matches). To specify a t-witness at
level ℓ, i.e., a guess of at most Θ(t) matches stemming from
levels ℓ and above, we first specify a non-negative number
for each of the last min{l, t} levels, i.e., for each integer
0 ≤ i ≤ min{ℓ− 1, t− 1} we specify an integer 0 ≤ bi ≤ t
with the restriction that
∑
i ibi ≤ t. As we will describe later
these bi essentially specify the number of extra substrings
stemming from level ℓ − i for which our guessed hash is
not matching the actual hash for the next iteration because
the substring is incorrect but has gone undetected so far.
To specify which substrings among those in this level those
are we have for each integer 0 ≤ i ≤ min{ℓ − 1, t − 1}
a subset of positive integers Bi ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , t2i} of size
|Bi| ≤ ⌊t2−i⌋+ bi.
Next we explain how exactly a t-witness in level ℓ for
t > Θ(k) encodes a set of at most
∑
i |Bi| =
∑
i⌊t2−i⌋+∑
i bi = 2t + t = 3t matches for a given matching Mℓ.
Recall that these matches exactly correspond to leafs in the
forest of still consistent matches. Process the Bi sets from
the largest i to the smallest and process each j ∈ Bi from the
smallest to the largest. In particular, we start with the largest
i for which Bi is non-empty and select the smallest integer
j ∈ Bi. This specifies a leaf stemming from level ℓ−i in one
of trees of depth i in the forest of still consistent matches
by simply taking the ⌈j/2i⌉th such tree and selecting its
((j mod 2i) + 1)th leaf (counting leafs in cut-out subtrees
as well). Any leaf can be specified this way if there are at
most t trees. Before continuing to process the next (larger)
j (or smaller i if there is no further integer in the current
Bi) we cut all nodes from the chosen substring to its root,
creating at most i subtrees of smaller depth which we add
to the corresponding levels. In essence we treat the match as
if it was discovered to be inconsistent and update the forest
of still consistent matches accordingly. We then continue
similarly with the next guess.
The reason for the cutting is that each incorrect substring
from a level ℓ − i tree corresponds to i failed hashes
with the caveat that for two such strings these hashes
might overlap. Cutting and reclassifying the cut-off trees
and leafs/substrings as above makes sure that any substring
specified by a j ∈ Bi corresponds to i disjoint failed hashes.
It remains to analyze the number of such t-witnesses and
to show that checking all t-witnesses for t = 6k suffices to
indeed check all typical ways in which hashes fail.
Lemma IV.6. For any t the number of t-witnesses is at most
exp(t).
Proof: The condition
∑
0≤i ibi = t implies that the
sum of all bi for a t-witness is at most t. The number
of possibilities of different choices for setting the b-values,
i.e., for distributing these these t “tokens” over at most t
levels, is at most
(
2t
t
)
= exp(t). Furthermore, the number
of possibilities to pick ⌊t2−i⌋+bi integers smaller than t2i is
at most
(
t2i
⌊t2−i⌋+bi
)
= Θ(4i)Θ(t)2
−i+bi ≤ exp(ti2−i + ibi).
The total number of different t-witnesses for a given set-
ting of b values is thus at most
∏
i exp(ti2
−i + ibi) =
exp(t
∑
j j2
−j) exp(
∑
i ibi) = exp(t).
Lemma IV.7. For t = 6k, with probability 1 − exp(−ot),
the set of substrings in Mℓ that are bad can be covered by
a t-witness.
Proof: Suppose the set S of bad level ℓ matches in
Mℓ cannot be covered by a t-witness. This means that there
exists as subset of levels I ⊆ [ℓ] such that for each i ∈
I the number of bad matches in Mℓ stemming from level
ℓ − i (after cutting) is by bi > 0 larger than ⌊t2−i⌋ where∑
i∈I ibi ≥ t.
Following the argument from Lemma IV.5 the number of
incorrectly matched substrings in the last level is at most 5k
with probability 1− exp(−ok) = 1− exp(−ot). In this case
on can choose b0 = 0 for any potential t-witness such that
I does not contain 0.
Next we show that the probability for a given set of such
bad matches to have survived up to iteration ℓ is at most
exp(−ot). In order for a specific substring that stems from
level ℓ − i to fail the i hashes including it in every level
but the last one must have failed. The probability for this
is exp(−io) for independent hashes, which is guaranteed
through the cutting of overlapping hashes. Given that there
are at most t2i substrings that get processed in level ℓ − i
the expected number of such substrings to be incorrect and
not previously discovered in this level is t exp(−io) and the
probability for ⌊t2−i⌋+bi such substrings to exist is at most
exp(−iobi). The probability for a fixed set of matches as
specified above to be a description of bad matches is thus at
most
∏
i∈I exp(−iobi) = exp(−o
∑
i∈I ibi) = exp(−ot).
According to Lemma IV.6 the number of t-witnesses is
at most exp(t) and specifying a full witness gives rise to at
least as many possibilities as just specifying the values for
all Bi with i ∈ I . Therefore A simple union bound over all
such possibilities completes the proof that having a set of
bad matches in Mℓ which cannot be covered by a t-witness
is at most exp(t) · exp(−ot) = exp(−ot).
Therefore, checking all exp(k) many Θ(k)-witnesses suf-
fices, with probability 1− exp(−ok), to find (a superset of)
the positions of the substrings which have a non-matching
hash in this level. Even trying all exp(o)5k possibilities for
what the correct hash values are for each of these exp(k)
guesses and verifying if it leads to a matching hash hi
for the whole string of hashes works correctly because the
probability that an incorrect guess has a matching hash hi
is exp(−o′k), which even after a union bound over all
exp(k) exp(ok) guesses is negligible.
Overall for any k ∈ Ω(log logn) ∩ O(log n) this makes
Algorithm 2 correct and efficient since each of the O(log n)
levels succeeds with probability 1 − exp(−ok) > 1 −
logO(1) n and the number of guesses in each level one
needs to try is at most exp(logn) = nO(1). In the case
of k < o(log logn) there are too many levels to simply do
a union bound with the exp(−ok) failure probabilities for
correctness and for larger k the number of guesses needed
makes the algorithm inefficient. These two problems are
handled relatively easily as we show next. We first prove
Theorem II.1 for the case of small k, i.e., for k = O(log n):
Proof of Theorem II.1 for k = O(log n). : We first
note that for o = O(1) the hashes in the summary SF are
indeed of size O(ok log n
k
) as desired. Furthermore, given
the constructions for ε-biased distributions from [22] one
can specify the randomness for each level using O(ok) bits
or O(ok log n
k
) across all levels. We thus overall have a
summary size of Oo(k log
n
k
) as claimed.
It furthermore follows almost immediately from
Lemma IV.5 that Algorithm 2 is a successful decoding
algorithm with probability log n
k
· exp(−ok) as long as R is
chosen independently from an exp(−ok) biased distribution
for each level.
In particular, by induction on ℓ, each iteration starts with
a correct HF [ℓ, .] and an okay matchingMℓ. This is true for
ℓ = 0 because HF [0, .] is part of the summary of F used
as an input and M0 is the empty 0-level matching which
consists of 4k unmatched hashes in F . For subsequent levels,
we get from Lemma IV.5 that Mℓ+1 is also okay. This then
leads to a guess H˜F (ℓ+1, .) for the level ℓ+1 hashes which
is correct up to 5k hashes. With probability 1 − exp(−ok)
these can be described by a Θ(k)-witness by Lemma IV.7.
Guessing the correct hash values for this witness then leads
to the correct hashes which is recognized by a matching of
the hash h′i. The probability that among the other exp(k)
many Θ(k)-witnesses each with exp(ok) guesses for their
hash values there is an incorrect one which still matches h′i
is exp(k) exp(ok) exp(−o′k) = exp(−o′k) < exp(−ok).
In each level we thus recover the correct hashes HF (ℓ +
1, .) with probability 1− exp(−ok). A union bound over all
log n
k
levels then leads to a failure probability of at most
log n
k
· exp(−ok).
While this failure probability is o(1) if k = ω(log logn)
it is not quite as strong as the exp(k + logn) failure prob-
ability claimed by Theorem II.1 and furthermore becomes
meaningless for even smaller k. Therefore, for k < log n√
o
we
modify Algorithm 2 as follows: Enumerate over any subset
U of levels of size |U | = O( log n√
ok
) levels and instead of
running Algorithm 2 on this level try all exp(k) different
k-plausible matchings as a possibility of ∆ℓ. Given that
there are at most
(
logn
|U|
)
= exp(log n log ok√
ok
) = n
log ok√
ok many
subsets of levels and at most exp(k|U |) = exp( logn√
o
) many
matchings to try for all of these levels this requires at most
n
log o√
o many different modified runs of Algorithm 2 which
is an essentially negligible overhead in the recovery time.
Furthermore, the probability that none of these runs success-
fully recovers F is at most the probability that of having
|U | failures in log n
k
trials in which each trial succeeds
independently with probability exp(−ok), and thus at most(
logn
|U|
)
exp(−ok)|U | < n log ok√ok exp(− logn√o) = n−
√
o.
To see this we apply Lemma IV.5 as before until the first
iteration fails, which happens with independent probability
of exp(−ok) for each iteration. We then look at the run in
which the first failed iteration is the first iteration which the
matching process is simply replaced by a “guess” for∆ℓ and
in particular when this guess is the correct matching. The
following iterations in this run again fail independently with
probability exp(−ok). If we continue to replace all failing
iterations in this run we end up with a correct run, unless
more than |U | iterations fail independently.
Over all these runs we get at most some n
log o√
o potential
guesses for F . For each such guess we can check whether
indeed a file F was recovered with ED(F ′, F ) < k. Adding
an independent random hash of F of size Θ(logn) to the
summary SF and checking whether it matches with what
was recovered is sufficient to ensure that the algorithm, with
high probability, only terminates and outputs a recovery once
the correct F is found.
Next we proof Theorem II.1 for the case of large k =
ω(logn). While here correctness and failure probabilities
are not an issue, efficiency is. In particular trying all exp(k)
guesses for Θ(t)-witnesses becomes super-polynomial and
thus intractable. The approach to avoid this is based on
simple sampling. Instead of trying to guess all Θ(k) sub-
strings with non-matching hashes and then verifying them
via the hash h′i we instead randomly put all substrings in
k/ logn subsets. With high probability each subset contains
at most O(log n) substrings that need correcting and the
same arguments as before show that with high probability
these can be specified with a Θ(logn)-witness. Trying
the polynomially many such witnesses in each class and
verifying them independently via separate hashes leads to a
simple polynomial time computation which succeeds with
high probability.
Proof of Theorem II.1 for k = ω(log n). : In addition
to the H-hashes in the summary SF which have size
O(ok log n
k
) as before some Θ(k) = Ω(logn) independent
bits of randomness are added for each level which, using the
ε-biased distributions from [22] are used to color each sub-
string in each level with a uniformly random color between
0 and ⌈ klogn⌉. For each level in SF there is furthermore
a hash of size O(o′ logn) bits added for each color class,
hashing the string of hashes of the same color. Here o′ >> o
is a sufficiently large constant. The summary size remains
O(k log n
k
) bits as before.
The algorithm for recovery essentially also follows Algo-
rithm 2 except that in order to recover the correct new set of
level ℓ+1 hashes HF (ℓ+1, .) in iteration ℓ we consider each
color class separately. In particular the algorithm enumerates
all Θ(logn)-witnesses with substrings in a single color class
c and all guesses for the correct hash values for them.
Lemma IV.6 guarantees that there are only a polynomial
number of such witnesses and thus a polynomial number of
different guesses for the part of HF (ℓ + 1, .) colored with
c. Which of these guesses is correct can be verified by the
extra O(log n) size hash added to SF and this verification
is correct with high probability. While it is clear that among
the 5k bad substrings guaranteed by Lemma IV.5 there
will be at most O(log n) in each color class with high
probability given that any such string ends up in a specific
color class c with probability logn
k
it remains to be shown
that these substrings are, with high probability, described by
a Θ(logn)-witness. This follows in the same way as the
proof of Lemma IV.7: In order for a specific substring in
level ℓ−i to be incorrect the i hashes including it must have
failed. The probability for this is exp(−io). The probability
to get colored c for a fixed c is furthermore independent
and Θ( logn
k
) giving an overall probability of log n
k
exp(−io).
Among the O(k2i) substrings in level ℓ − i the expected
number of substrings discovered to be incorrect in this level
and be in color class c is thus logn exp(−io) and the prob-
ability for |Bi| ≤ ⌊logn2−i⌋+ bi such substrings to exist is
at most exp(−iobi). The probability for a fixed O(log n)-
witness to describe substrings with non-matching hashes is
thus
∏
i exp(−iobi) = exp(−o
∑
i ibi) = exp(−o logn) =
n−O(o). For a sufficiently large t = Θ(logn) no such t-
witness which describes substrings with incorrect hashes
exists which means that all the substrings whose hashes
need correcting can be described by a t′-witness with t′ < t
and are thus found and corrected by the recovery algorithm.
Overall each iteration succeeds with high probability also
giving the desired with high probability guarantee for the
entire algorithm.
V. DERANDOMIZING ALGORITHM 1 - THE
DETERMINISTIC DOCUMENT EXCHANGE PROTOCOL OF
THEOREM II.2 AND NEW ERROR CORRECTING CODES
In this section we show how to derandomize Algorithm 1
and complete the proofs of Theorem II.2 and Theorem II.3.
A. Derandomizing Algorithm 1 and the Proof of Theo-
rem II.2
As a first important step we show that one can
significantly weaken the requirements Lemma IV.4 puts on
the quality of the randomness provided. In particular, the
conclusion of Lemma IV.4 holds with high probability even
if we use a (n−c)-biased distribution.
Lemma V.1. For every sufficiently large c ≥ 1 it holds
that if o = c log n
k
and R is sampled from an n−2c-biased
distribution of bits then for every level i the probability that
there exists a k-bad matching of F under hash and R is at
most n−Ω(c).
In order to prove this we apply a trick very similar to
the long-distance property in [17] used to derandomized
synchronization strings. In particular, we show that we can
restrict ourselves to use much smaller (sub-)matchings as
witnesses:
Lemma V.2. If F has a k-bad self-matching under hasho
R
in level ℓ than for any 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k2 it also has a k′-bad self-
matching under hasho
R
in level ℓ with (ik′−i1)+(i′k′−i′1) ≤
4k′
k
n.
Proof: Let i1, . . . , ik, i
′
1, . . . , i
′
k ∈ [1, n] be the in-
dices for the k-bad matching of F under hasho
R
in
level ℓ. Decompose this k-bad matching into ⌊ k
k′ ⌋ ≥
k
2k′ many k
′-bad matchings where i(j−1)k′+1, . . . , ijk′ and
i′(j−1)k′+1, . . . , i
′
jk′ are the indices for the j
th such match-
ing. Denote with ℓj = (ijk′−ij−1)k′+1)+(i′jk′−i′(j−1)k′+1)
the total length of the jth matching. Note that the total
length of all these k′-bad matchings sums up to at most 2n.
Therefore the shortest such matching is a k′-bad matching
in F with the desired length bound of at most 2nk
2k′
.
We can now prove Lemma V.1 in a similar way as
Lemma IV.4.
Proof of Lemma V.1: According to Lemma V.2 it
suffices to prove that with high probability F does not have
a k′-bad matching with the “length restriction” (ik′ − i1) +
(i′k′ − i′1) ≤ 4k
′
k
n for some k′. We choose k′ = lognlog n
k
such
that ok′ = c logn. We again start with the case that R is
sampled from iid uniformly random bits. The probability
for any two sub-strings of F to have a bad hash is still 2−o.
Furthermore, for a fixed k′-bad matching the probability that
all matching pairs are bad under hash is 2−ok
′
= n−c.
There furthermore exist at most n2 ways to pick ik′ and
i′k′ and at most
( 4k′
k
n
2k′−2
)
=
(
n
k
)O(k′)
ways to pick the other
2k′ − 2 indices given the length restriction for a total of
n2 ·2k′ log nk = nO(1) potentially k′-bad matchings satisfying
the length restriction. Choosing the constant c large enough
and taking a union bound over all these potentially bad
matchings guarantees that, with high probability, no such
matching is k′ bad which due to Lemma V.2 guarantees that
F does not have a k-bad matching. Given that our argument
for one k′-bad matching (again, similar to Lemma IV.4)
under a R sampled from iid uniformly random bits only
depends on O(log n) linear test on bits from R sampling R
instead from an (n−c)-biased distribution does not change
the above argument.
The improvement of Lemma V.1 to polynomially biased
random bits is particularly useful because there are simple
constructions of such spaces with a polynomial size support
which can be efficiently explored [22]. Furthermore, our
definition of a k-bad matching in F has the advantage
that it only depends on R and F (and not F ′). This
allows one to determine independently of F ′ whether
a certain R is a good choice for the “randomness” of
Algorithm 1 when run on F . Putting all this together we
get an efficient deterministic hashing scheme with summary
size of O(k log2 n
k
):
Proof of Theorem II.2: Given F and k we set n = |F |
and o = c log n
k
for some small but sufficiently large constant
c. Take a construction of an |R| = no log n
k
long (n−c)-
biased bit vector with polynomial support [22]. One by one
(or in parallel) set R to be one of these bit vectors and
test whether under R there exists a k-bad matching in F
underR using a standard dynamic program. Do this until one
setting of R is found for which no such matching exists. The
existence of such an R is guaranteed by Lemma V.1. The
summary creation algorithm then uses this R and hash and
o to create SF . It also adds the O(log n) bit description of R
to SF . The recovery algorithm is now simply Algorithm 1.
Furthermore, because there is, by construction, no k-bad
matching Lemma IV.3 guarantees that Algorithm 1 indeed
terminates correctly.
B. New Error Correcting Codes for Insertions and Deletions
and the Proof of Theorem II.3
Finally one can use the deterministic document exchange
protocol from Theorem II.2 and transform it into an error
correcting code for insdel errors. For sake of complete we
give here a complete proof of this (folklore) transformation:
Proof of Theorem II.3: To encode X we run the
deterministic document exchange scheme from Theorem II.2
for edit distance 2k to obtain the summary SX consisting of
Θ(k log2 n
k
) bits which can be converted into O(k
log2 n
k
log q +k)
symbols from Σ. If this is less than k symbols we pad it to be
Θ(k) symbols long. Next we encode these O(k
log2 n
k
log q + k)
symbols with any efficient error correcting block code E
which protects against a constant fraction of insdel errors,
which is at least 2k insdels. For this we can use [12], [14],
[15] or [16]. This increases the size by at most a constant.
Overall we use the r = O(k
log2 n
k
log q + k) symbols of E(SX)
as the non-systematic part of the encoding C(X).
Recovery now is also simple. Given a corrupted codeword
C′ we interpret the first n symbols as a corrupted version
X ′ of X and the last r symbols as a corrupted version E′
of E(SX). It is clear if ED(C
′, C(X)) ≤ k then both E′
and X ′ have edit distance at most 2k from E(SX) and X
respectively. This allows us to decode E′ to SX and then
use the document exchange recovery algorithm to recover
X from X ′ and SX .
The insdel codes from Theorem II.3 improve over
the error correcting code by Brakensiek, Guruswami and
Zbarsky [18] with redundancy Θ(k2 log k logn) which are
efficient under the strong assumption that k is a fixed
constant independent of n and codes from Belazzougui’s
derandomized document exchange scheme [6] which have a
redundancy of Θ(k2 + k logn). For the case of k = εn the
near optimal redundancy of Θ(ε log2 1
ε
· n) is a quadratic
improvement over the codes of Guruswami et al. [13], [14]
and Haeupler, Shahrasbi and Vitercik [16], [15] which have
redundancy Θ(
√
ε
(
log 1
ε
)O(1) · n). The work of Cheng et
al. [3], which obtained Theorem II.2 independently and
simultaneously, developed the ideas behind the deterministic
document exchange even further and obtain non-systematic
insdel codes with redundancy O(k logn). This is asymptoti-
cally optimal for any k < n1−ε. Due to their non-systematic
nature these codes do not correspond to a deterministic
document exchange protocol. It remains an interesting open
question whether Theorem II.2 can be improved and whether
an efficient deterministic document exchange with optimal
summary size, matching Theorem II.1, is possible.
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